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Summary  Group  A  Streptococcal  (GAS)  Toxic  Shock  Syndrome  (TSS)  is  an  acute,
rapidly  progressive,  and  often  fatal  illness.  Outbreaks  can  occur  in  hospitals.  How-
ever,  early  infection  control  measures  may  interrupt  transmissions  and  prevent
morbidity  and  mortality.
Two  cases  of  invasive  GAS  TSS  were  diagnosed  within  48  h  after  two  uncomplicated
laparoscopic  surgeries  that  were  performed  in  the  same  operating  room  of  a  women’s
hospital.
Investigations  conducted  by  the  infection  prevention  and  control  department  of
the  hospital  identiﬁed  46  obstetrical  staff  members  who  were  involved  in  the  sur-
geries  and/or  had  contact  with  either  of  the  patients.  All  of  the  staff  members  were
interviewed  regarding  any  recent  history  of  upper  respiratory  tract  infections,  the
presence  of  skin  lesions  and  vaginal  or  rectal  symptoms.  Throat,  rectal,  and  vaginal
cultures  were  obtained  two  times  from  all  of  the  involved  staff  members.  Throat
colonization  with  GAS  was  detected  in  the  cultures  from  one  obstetrical  intern  who
attended  the  1st  surgery  and  from  one  nurse  who  had  formerly  worked  in  the  post-
natal  ward.  These  two  strains  were  epidemiologically  different  from  each  other  and
from  the  outbreak  strain.  Both  carriers  were  suspended  from  direct  patient  care
and  were  treated  with  a  ten-day  course  of  oral  clindamycin.  The  success  of  their
decolonization  status  was  assessed  at  the  end  of  therapy  and  at  three,  six,  nine  and
twelve  months  thereafter  before  reassigning  them  to  routine  work.
Unfortunately,  in  spite  of  the  extensive  investigation  of  all  involved  personnel  and
of  the  environment,  the  mode  of  transmission  to  the  second  patient  could  not  be
established.  However,  droplet  or  airborne  transmission  could  not  be  ruled  out.
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Early  and  meticulous  implementation  of  infection  control  measures  was  crucial  and
instrumental  in  the  successful  management  and  control  of  this  outbreak.  Furthermore,
there  were  no  subsequent  GAS  cases  detected  during  the  24  months  following  the
outbreak.
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an emergency  diagnostic  laparotomy,  which  was
conducted  in  a different  operating  room.  Diffuse©  2012  King  Saud  Bin  Ab
Ltd.  All  rights  reserved.
ntroduction
AS  TSS  is  an  uncommon  form  of  septicemia  caused
y Streptococcus  pyogenes  (Lanceﬁeld  group  A),
hich is  also  the  pathogen  responsible  for  scarlet
ever and  other  Streptococcal  soft  tissue  infections.
s with  Staphylococcal  TSS,  invasive  Streptococ-
al diseases  are  also  caused  by  biologically  potent
xotoxins  that  mediate  fever,  shock,  and  tissue
njury  [1].  During  the  20th  century,  there  has
een a  signiﬁcant  reduction  in  the  incidence  and
everity  of  Streptococcal  infections  that  is  par-
ially attributable  to  the  use  of  antibiotics  and  to
mproved socioeconomic  conditions,  especially  in
he industrialized  world.  Variations  in  the  expres-
ion of  virulence  factors  by  the  pathogen  were
ound to  be  responsible  for  the  reduction  in  the
ncidence and  severity  of  streptococcal  infections
n the  late  1980s  [2—4].  However,  S.  pyogenes  re-
merged  with  renewed  virulence  and  has  posed  a
lobal public  health  problem  [5,6].
Sporadic  outbreaks  of  S.  pyogenes  were  pre-
ominantly characterized  by  a  rapidly  progressive
isorder that  was  often  associated  with  severe  sup-
urative soft  tissue  infections  [6].
In  some  studies  involving  women  of  childbear-
ng age,  the  prevalence  of  vaginal  colonization  with
AS was  less  than  1%,  suggesting  that  endogenous
ources are  uncommon  and  that  clustering  of  cases
r outbreaks  associated  with  health  care  facilities
an usually  be  traced  to  a  single  carrier.  These  car-
iers are  usually  health  care  workers  colonized  with
he organism  in  a  skin  lesion  or  in  the  throat,  vagina
r rectum  [7,8].  The  causes  of  colonization  with
AS and,  in  some  cases,  its  subsequent  transmission
re  unknown.  There  are  a  few  published  reports
n attempts  to  eradicate  the  GAS  carrier  state;
n most  of  these  reports,  the  treatment  modality,
xtent and  duration  of  follow-up  varied,  offering
ittle information  to  guide  physicians  in  the  man-
gement  of  these  carriers  [9—11].
We  present  two  cases  of  post-laparoscopic  inva-
ive GAS  TSS  occurring  in  a  busy  tertiary  care  center
334 beds  and  over  22,830  admissions  in  2009).
wo cases  of  invasive  GAS  disease  were  diagnosed
ithin 48  h  of  each  other,  activating  intervention
y the  infection  prevention  and  control  program
f the  hospital.  These  cases  and  a  review  of  the
i
t
P
eiterature  are  presented  with  respect  to  both  the
ossible mode  of  transmission  of  GAS  and  the  impor-
ance of  an  infection  control  role  in  preventing
nd/or controlling  similar  outbreaks.
ase presentation
ase  1  (index  patient):  A  39-year-old  female,  para
 +  0,  was  brought  to  the  Women’s  Hospital  emer-
ency  room  with  a  history  of  amenorrhea  lasting  10
eeks, vaginal  bleeding  for  9  days  and  severe  lower
bdominal  pain  for  1  day.  Her  medical  history  was
neventful.  On  arrival  at  the  emergency  room,  the
hysical examination  was  unremarkable,  except  for
ocalized tenderness  on  the  left  iliac  fossa.
Abdominal  ultrasonography  revealed  a tur-
id ﬂuid  in  the  left  para-ovarian  space  and  a
eft adnexial  mass,  suggestive  of  ectopic  preg-
ancy.  Laboratory  investigations  revealed  a positive
rine pregnancy  test,  beta  human  chorionic
onadotrophin  of  473.8  IU/l  and  an  elevated  white
lood cell  count  of  15,500/l.  A  diagnosis  of  ectopic
regnancy  was  made,  and  the  patient  underwent
 laparoscopic  left  salpingectomy.  The  patient  did
ot receive  a prophylactic  antibiotic,  and  she  had
n uneventful  recovery  and  was  transferred  to  the
ard in  stable  condition.
However,  6 h  postoperatively,  she  developed
bdominal pain,  with  a temperature  spike  of
8 ◦C.  Intravenous  treatment  with  cefuroxime  and
etronidazole  was  started.  Twenty-four  hours  post-
urgery, her  symptoms  became  more  severe,  and
he became  dyspneic  and  hypotensive.  Additional
aboratory testing  showed  a  signiﬁcant  drop  in
emoglobin  (10.2  g/dl),  and  blood  cultures  taken
pon admission  revealed  gram-positive  cocci  that
ere conﬁrmed  to  be  GAS.
The patient’s  condition  continued  to  deteri-
rate, with  progressive  signs  and  symptoms  of
ultiorgan  impairment.  Her  condition  necessitatedschemia  of  all  intra-abdominal  organs,  with  ﬂuid
hroughout  the  abdominal  cavity,  was  apparent.
eritoneal ﬂuid  samples  that  were  taken  intraop-
ratively  also  grew  GAS.  A  diagnosis  of  TSS  was
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made,  and  treatment  with  intravenous  meropenem
and vancomycin  was  started.
Despite  intensive  care  management  and  ade-
quate  resuscitative  efforts,  the  patient  expired  on
the third  day  following  surgery.
Case 2:  After  the  ﬁrst  case  of  TSS,  a  31-year-old
female, para  6  +  1,  presented  to  the  gynecologi-
cal clinic  for  an  elective  tubal  ligation.  Nineteen
hours following  the  surgery  of  the  1st  case,  the  sec-
ond patient  underwent  laparoscopic  bilateral  tubal
ligation  in  the  same  operating  room  in  which  the
surgery on  the  index  patient  had  been  performed.
The second  patient  did  not  receive  any  preoper-
ative antibiotic  prophylaxis  and  was  discharged  in
very good  condition  on  the  same  day.
Less  than  24  h later,  she  was  readmitted  with
severe abdominal  pain  and  nausea.  The  physi-
cal examination  revealed  generalized  abdominal
tenderness and  absent  bowel  sounds.  The  labora-
tory tests  were  insigniﬁcant,  and  the  abdominal
X-ray showed  free  gas  under  the  diaphragm.  She
was started  on  intravenous  meropenam  and  van-
comycin.  The  patient’s  condition  continued  to
deteriorate,  and  signs  and  symptoms  of  multiorgan
failure were  observed.
A  bedside  ultrasound  revealed  a  moderate  to
large amount  of  free  ﬂuid  in  the  peritoneal  cavity.
A laparotomy  was  performed  to  rule  out  bowel  per-
foration.  A bilateral  salpingectomy  was  performed,
and the  drained  peritoneal  ﬂuid  grew  GAS.  A diag-
nosis of  TSS  was  made,  and  clindamycin  was  added
to the  treatment  regime.  With  continued  inten-
sive care  treatment,  the  patient  exhibited  signs  of
improvement,  and  two  weeks  later,  she  was  dis-
charged  in  very  good  condition.
Materials and methods
Infection control surveillance and measures
Following  the  identiﬁcation  of  the  two  GAS  cases,
infection  prevention  and  control  precautions  were
implemented  as  follows:
• Both  patients  were  promptly  isolated  using  con-
tact and  standard  precautions.
• The  operating  room  was  closed  for  further  inves-
tigation.
• An  extensive  review  of  the  two  patients’  medical
records and  other  relevant  documents  was  con-
ducted  to  identify  potential  GAS  carriers  among
obstetrical staff  members  who  were  directly
engaged in  the  patients’  care.
• The  obstetrical  staff  members  who  had  direct
involvement with  either  of  the  two  patients  were
interviewed  about  any  recent  history  of  upper
f
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respiratory  tract  infections,  the  presence  of  skin
lesions and  vaginal  or  rectal  symptoms.
 Throat,  rectal,  and/or  vaginal  swabs  for  GAS
cultures were  obtained  twice  from  all  of  the  iden-
tiﬁed obstetrical  personnel.
 The  husband  of  the  second  patient  was  the  only
family  member  who  was  available  for  assess-
ment. A  throat  swab  from  him  was  taken  for
screening.
 Staff  members  with  signs  and  symptoms  of  upper
respiratory  infections  were  excluded  from  work
inside  the  operating  rooms  and  from  direct  care
of patients.
 Two  obstetrical  procedures  performed  in  the  time
period  between  the  surgeries  of  the  two  patients
and  an  additional  12  gynecological  laparoscopic
surgeries conducted  in  the  same  operating  room
as those  of  the  two  patients  with  TSS  were  mon-
itored for  potential  GAS  infections.
 The  hospital  conducted  an  extensive  envi-
ronmental screening  of  the  operating  room,
including different  parts  of  the  laparoscope,  the
anesthesia  machines,  the  surgical  instruments,
the solutions  (cidex,  povidone),  the  room  sur-
face, the  air  and  light  sources.
 All  machines  and  equipment  in  the  operating
room were  checked  for  adequate  cleaning  and
disinfection  according  to  our  infection  control
policy.
As an  extra  precautionary  tool,  plasma  steriliza-
tion was  used  to  sterilize  the  laparoscopy  instru-
ments  Additional  instruments  were  requested.
 The  surgical  protocol  for  laparoscopy  instruments
was reviewed  and  relevantly  revised.
 A  high-level  disinfection  of  anesthesia  masks  and
equipment  was  performed  using  thermal  washer
disinfection.
 Education  pertaining  to  GAS  infections  was  pro-
vided for  the  obstetrical  staff.
icrobiological methods
ll  specimens  were  cultured  on  5%  sheep  blood
gar plates  and  were  anaerobically  incubated  for
8 h.  All  beta-hemolytic  Streptococci  colonies  were
yped as  GAS  using  a latex  test  (Remel  Streptex,
emel Europe  Ltd.  Dartford,  Kent,  UK).
GAS isolates  were  identiﬁed  at  a reference  lab-
ratory  (the  Streptococcus  &  Diphtheria  Reference
nit,  Respiratory  &  Systemic  Infection  Laboratory,
PA, Colindale,  UK)  using  emm  gene  typing  as
ollows:
The typing  of  GAS  was  based  upon  the  detection
of T1  protein  antigens,  the  opacity  factor,  and
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determination  of  the  M  protein  by  sequencing  the
emm gene.
The T1  protein  (an  epidemiological  marker)  was
used in  the  ‘ﬁrst  stage’  of  GAS  typing.
 The  emm  genotyping  (genotypic  detection  of
the emm  gene,  which  encodes  the  M  protein)
was performed  by  sequencing  the  5′ hypervari-
able region  of  the  emm  gene.  The  results  were
reported as  an  emm  sequence  type,  which  usually
correlates  with  the  M  protein  type.
esults
nfection control results
he  review  of  charts  identiﬁed  46  obstetrical  staff
embers  who  were  involved  in  the  care  of  the
atients  either  during  surgeries  or  in  the  pre-  and
ostoperative  periods.  All  had  surveillance  cultures
or GAS  taken  from  the  throat,  rectum  and/or
agina. None  of  the  staff  were  found  to  have  a
kin infection.  One  obstetrical  intern  who  attended
he 1st  surgery  and  one  nurse  who  had  previously
orked in  a  postnatal  ward  were  found  to  be  col-
nized  in  the  throat  with  a  GAS  strain.  These  two
trains  were  epidemiologically  different  from  each
ther and  from  the  strain  that  caused  the  outbreak.
The  GAS-positive  nurse  and  obstetrical  intern
ere immediately  suspended  from  care  of  patients
nd were  treated  with  a  10-day  course  of  oral  clin-
amycin.  Success  of  the  decolonization  of  GAS  was
ssessed at  the  end  of  treatment  and  every  three
onths  for  one  year.
No  GAS  case  was  identiﬁed  among  the12  laparo-
copic obstetrical  procedures  that  were  performed
n the  same  operating  room  between  the  surgeries
f the  two  patients.  None  of  the  25  environmen-
al samples  grew  GAS.  The  throat  swab  of  the  2nd
atient’s  husband  was  also  found  to  be  negative  for
AS. The  operating  room  was  reopened  eight  weeks
fter the  outbreak,  following  the  successful  control
f the  incidences  of  GAS  infection.
icrobiological results
hile  the  cultures  of  the  blood  samples,  the  per-
toneal ﬂuid  and  the  wound  swabs  of  the  index
atient all  grew  GAS,  only  the  peritoneal  ﬂuid  of
he 2nd  patient  was  positive  for  GAS.
The  two  isolates  of  GAS  recovered  from  the  index
atient and  the  one  isolate  recovered  from  the
nd patient  were  identical  based  on  emm  typing
T1: opacity  factor  −ve:  emm1),  and  they  were
omparable to  the  control  strain.  The  other  two
trains  were  different  from  each  other  and  from  the
atients’ strain  (T  non-typable  opacity  factor  −ve
t
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mm  typing  and  T-type  3/13/B3264:  opacity  factor
ve: emm  89).
The  culture  samples  from  the  throats  and  vaginas
f both  patients  were  negative  for  GAS.
iscussion and literature review
n  our  report,  in  both  cases,  the  diagnosis  of  inva-
ive GAS  TSS  was  demonstrated  by  the  isolation  of
AS from  the  ﬂuid  drained  from  the  peritoneal  cav-
ty and  from  the  blood  sample  in  the  index  patient
n the  presence  of  abdominal  pain,  hypovolemia
nd other  signs  and  symptoms  of  multiorgan  failure.
oth patients  received  massive  antibiotic  treat-
ent, and  clindamycin  was  added  upon  detection
f GAS.  Despite  intensive  care  management  and
dequate  resuscitative  efforts,  the  index  patient
xpired  on  the  third  postoperative  day.  Invasive  GAS
SS treatment  and  the  cause  of  death  are  beyond
he scope  of  this  report.
To  our  knowledge,  our  report  is  the  ﬁrst  one
n Qatar  describing  a fatal  Streptococcal  infection
ausing TSS.
Infection  control  investigations  were  started
fter the  second  case  was  identiﬁed.  These  inves-
igations  revealed  that  the  patients  in  the  report
ere admitted  19  h apart  for  laparoscopic  surgeries
n the  same  operating  room.
The study  did  not  conclude  that  the  laparoscope
ould have  been  the  vehicle  of  GAS  transmission
ecause the  screening  of  the  only  shared  parts  of
he laparoscope  (the  light  source,  camera  and  tele-
cope) did  not  detect  any  GAS  contamination.  No
reach of  surgical  aseptic  techniques  or  lack  of
ompliance  with  standard  precautions  during  sur-
eries was  noted.  Moreover,  no  GAS  infection  was
dentiﬁed  in  either  of  the  two  obstetrical  proce-
ures performed  between  the  surgeries  of  the  two
atients  or  in  any  of  the  additional  12  gynecolog-
cal laparoscopic  surgeries  performed  in  the  same
perating  room.
The  case  histories,  clinical  examination  and
urveillance cultures  of  the  healthcare  personnel
nvolved in  the  care  of  the  two  patients  in  the  report
evealed  that  two  staff  members  had  throat  col-
nization  with  strains  epidemiologically  different
rom each  other  and  from  the  outbreak  strain.  This
nding is  in  contrast  with  reports  from  earlier  stud-
es, in  which  most  GAS  outbreaks  could  be  traced  to
 single  healthcare  worker  colonized  with  the  same
train [7,8,12,13].
Unfortunately,  in  spite  of  the  extensive  inves-igations of  all  involved  personnel  and  the
nvironment, the  mode  of  transmission  of  GAS
o the  second  patient  could  not  be  established.
m
n
p
p
s
i
s
c
a
a
t
t
s
e
i
c
m
t
R
s
a
o
o
c
e
o
C
I
c
s
t
s
a
a
v
f
p
t
G
C
F392  
This  ﬁnding  coincides  with  earlier  reports  that  pre-
sented similar  results  [14—17].
However,  in  spite  of  the  inconclusive  evidence,
we believe  that  the  index  patient  could  have  served
as the  source  of  the  infection  in  the  second  patient.
GAS was  recovered  from  the  index  patient  upon
admission.  Aerosolization  has  been  widely  docu-
mented  as  a  major  route  of  transmission.  The
supporting  evidentiary  factors  for  this  theory  are:
the lack  of  direct  contact  between  a  case  and
a carrier;  GAS-positive  quantitative  air  cultures
obtained in  the  presence  of  a  carrier;  and  an  occur-
rence of  infections  in  patients  undergoing  surgery  in
rooms recently  vacated  by  a  GAS  carrier  [18—20].
Although  airborne  transmission  has  been  reported
by some  authors  as  an  inefﬁcient  route  of  trans-
mission,  more  recent  data  has  linked  occurrences
of outbreaks  to  throat  colonization  of  health  care
workers  [12,21,22].
It appears  that  the  abdominal  incision  could
have served  as  the  portal  of  entry  for  infection
in the  2nd  case;  therefore,  we  hypothesize  that
droplet  and/or,  to  a  lesser  extent,  airborne  trans-
mission caused  the  spread  of  infection  to  the  second
patient.  In almost  50%  of  reported  cases,  a  deﬁnite
portal  of  entry  could  not  be  described  [23].
The organism  can  be  acquired  through  person-
to-person contact  [17],  but  our  involved  personnel
did not  have  skin  infections  with  GAS  or  any  other
overt  infection.
Both  patients  were  strictly  isolated  according
to transmission-based  precautionary  procedures.
Unfortunately,  we  did  not  screen  the  throats,
rectums and  vaginas  of  both  patients  for  GAS  colo-
nization.  No  subsequent  GAS  infection  was  detected
during  the  two  years  following  the  outbreak.
The review  of  the  patients’  charts  identiﬁed  46
staff members  who  were  directly  involved  in  the
care of  either  patient.  Their  histories  and  clinical
examinations  did  not  reveal  any  sore  throat,  skin,
rectal or  vaginal  symptoms  suggestive  of  GAS.  Iden-
tiﬁcation  of  GAS  alone  in  the  health  care  workers
was not  sufﬁcient  to  link  them  to  the  outbreak;
DNA typing  of  the  three  strains  indicated  that  the
strains of  the  patients  were  identical,  and  those
of the  two  staff  members  were  not  epidemiologi-
cally linked  to  each  other  or  to  the  outbreak  strain
[12]. Both  staff  members  with  GAS  were  removed
from direct  patient  contact  and  were  treated  orally
with a  ten-day  course  of  clindamycin.  The  success
of their  decolonization  status  was  assessed  at  the
end of  therapy  and  at  three,  six,  nine  and  twelve
months  thereafter  before  they  were  reassigned  to
their routine  work.
In  some  published  reports,  recurrence  of  an  out-
break was  traceable  to  a  colonization  of  family
A
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embers  of  the  index  case  [18,24,25]. Unfortu-
ately, in  this  study,  the  husband  of  the  second
atient was  the  only  family  member  of  either
atient who  was  available  for  interview,  and  his
urveillance  culture  was  negative.  No  further  GAS
nfection  was  detected  thereafter.
The literature  also  indicates  that  environmental
creenings should  be  considered  [26],  especially  in
ases with  there  is  a lack  of  evidence  of  infection
mong hospital  personnel.  These  screenings  were
ll uneventful.
As has  been  previously  reported,  early  infec-
ion control  intervention  after  the  detection  of
he second  case  was  the  key  measure  behind  the
uccessful  control  of  this  outbreak  [27]  Strict  adher-
nce to  infection  control  practices,  such  as  contact
solation;  enhancement  of  standard  precautions;
leaning, disinfection,  and  sterilization  of  instru-
ents;  and  the  proper  environmental  cleaning  of
he operating  theatres  were  strictly  implemented.
elevant educational  programs  for  all  hospital  per-
onnel were  equally  important.  Moreover,  timely
nd regular  reports  regarding  the  progress  of  the
utbreak  to  all  concerned  had  a  signiﬁcant  impact
n the  implementation  of  the  infection  control  pre-
autions and  demonstrates  the  vital  importance  of
ngaging all  hospital  personnel  in  the  management
f any  outbreak.
onclusion
nvasive  GAS  TSS  is  a serious  disease  with  a  high
ase fatality  rate.  Unfortunately,  in  spite  of  exten-
ive investigations  of  all  involved  personnel  and  of
he environment,  the  mode  of  transmission  to  the
econd patient  could  not  be  established.  Droplet  or
irborne transmission  could  not  be  ruled  out.
The infection  control  service  of  the  hospital  had
 signiﬁcant  role  in  stopping  the  outbreak  and  pre-
enting any  new  cases  of  GAS  during  the  24  months
ollowing the  ﬁrst  case.  More  data  are  needed  to
rove and  to  accurately  deﬁne  the  magnitude  of
he airborne  and/or  environmental  transmission  of
AS.
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